Beyond the Juristic Orientation of International Criminal Justice: The Relevance of Criminological Insight to International Criminal Law and its Control by Rothe, Dawn L & Mullins, Christopher W
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
OpenSIUC
Articles Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice
2010
Beyond the Juristic Orientation of International
Criminal Justice: The Relevance of Criminological
Insight to International Criminal Law and its
Control
Dawn L. Rothe
Old Dominion University
Christopher W. Mullins
Southern Illinois University Carbondale, mullinsc@siu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/ccj_articles
Published in International Criminal Law Review, Vol. 10 No. 1 (2010) at doi: 10.1163/
157181209X12584562670893
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact opensiuc@lib.siu.edu.
Beyond the Juristic Orientation of International Criminal Justice: 
The Relevance of Criminological Insight to International Criminal Law and its Control 
 
A Commentary 
 
Dawn L Rothe, PhD1. 
 
Christopher W. Mullins, PhD. 
 
 Nearly seven years ago, Paul Roberts and Nesam McMillan2 authored a piece 
titled, “For Criminology in International Criminal Justice,” drawing attention to the 
relevance of criminological insight on issues of international criminal law and criminal 
justice to legal scholars and practitioners. Over the course of the past decade, a few 
criminologists have attempted to draw attention to the relevance of international legal 
doctrine and procedural norms.3 Nevertheless, the merging of these paradigms and 
subsequent sharing of insights has been slow to say the least. Certainly, criminologists 
have much to learn from juristic analysis concerning substantive and procedural 
processes and issues, likewise legal scholars and practitioners have much to learn 
concerning the social, political, economic, and cultural phenomenon relevant to crime 
commission and deterrence.  
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 While juristic and political discussion of international criminal justice pays some 
attention to the “tenuous connection between trials and deterrence” it generally ignores 
the complex debates and criminological literature on the efficacy of the general deterrent 
effect of domestic criminal justice systems.4  When it is discussed, it is often in terms of 
the role, or lack thereof, of political will impacting international criminal justice’s 
deterrent effect (i.e., realpolitik) and fails to consider the overwhelming evidence that 
suggests a strong deterrent effect of law is problematic. Instead, the efficacy of and/or 
potential of a deterrent effect is taken as an a’priori.  For example, Judge Richard 
Goldstone, former chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, states with an optimistic declaration, “In establishing the 
tribunals, the Security Council has struck a meaningful blow against impunity. It has sent 
a message to would-be war criminals that the international community is no longer 
prepared to allow serious war crimes to be committed without the threat of retribution.”5  
Likewise, after the entry of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court 
occurred, an additional mantra on the belief in unconditional deterrence was espoused by 
many within the international political community:6 
“…We need a new form of deterrence against such forms of behaviour. The 
establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC), which makes impunity illegal 
and which holds individuals directly accountable for their actions, is that deterrent” (H.E. 
Mr. Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada 2000). 
                                                 
4James Silk. 2009: 6. International Criminal Justice and the Protection of Human Rights: The Rule of Law or the 
Hubris of Law? Working Paper, Yale University Law School (August 21, 2009). Available online: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1459513 
5
 Quoted in Silk 2009: 6. ibid 
6
 The following quotes were taken directly from the ICC UPDATE. 14th edition. CICC Secretariat, New York, NY. 18, 
October 2000. 
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“…We are confident that the establishment of the International Criminal Court will be an 
efficient step undertaken by the international community towards deterring the possible 
perpetrators from committing such acts.” (H.E. Ms. Nadezhda Mihailova, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria 2000) 
“…We believe that the International Criminal Court will play an indispensable role here 
as a deterrent and preventive remedy as well.” (H.E. Mr. Irakli Menagarishvili, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of Georgia 2000). 
“…An effective international court system should be available to bring those who breach 
these rules to justice, at the same time as serving to deter potential perpetrators. With this 
in mind, I believe that the greatest achievements towards strengthening the international 
legal system in recent years have been the establishment of the Criminal Tribunals for the 
Former Republic of Yugoslavia and for Rwanda and the adoption of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court.” 
This view arises out of the modern conceptualization of law developed in the wake of the 
writings of Cesaere Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham and, as we will show below, out of a 
rationalized enlightenment view of the human mind. The deterrent effect claimed in these 
statements is optimistic given the criminological research on deterrence. This is not 
meant to disparage the work of the Tribunals, the International Criminal Court, or of the 
judicial processes and decisions overall, as they deal with grave and difficult cases and 
present complex evidentiary and legal challenges. This is also not the only population 
with a blind belief in the deterrent effects of law. Nonetheless, as an argument for the 
need of international criminal justice to be more inclusive and less exclusive, 
criminological insight can only enhance these processes and decisions by highlighting 
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issues and processes that influence the nature of violations of law and are thus important 
to understand for case processing in international criminal justice.  
 The next two sections explore the theoretical and policy bearing of criminological 
thought to international criminal justice by drawing from the ideology and theory of 
deterrence and legitimacy.  After all, both of these concepts are intertwined and of central 
relevance to ending impunity for heads of state and high ranking officials and 
constraining future incidences of international criminal law violations. 
Deterrence7 
 
 
“I also fully accept, within the margin determined by the Appellant’s individual guilt, the 
special emphasis on general deterrence….in particular when it is to prevent commanders 
in similar circumstances from committing similar crimes in  the future”.8 
 
The foundation of the rule of law is premised on the notion of social order and with the 
understanding that the laws that govern the broader social contract serve as specific and 
general deterrents. Thus, laws ideally serve to deter criminality. Prosecutions for such 
violations serve as a specific deterrent to the offender and as a general deterrent to others 
by means of solidifying the international norms prohibiting such behaviors by way of 
example. Deterrence then is a model of obedience.9   
 The potential for deterrence to be effective at the international level is not far 
reaching. As street crime research has shown, social location and position strongly 
influences deterrence.10  While an expansion of the more simplistic rational choice model 
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Deterrence.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 30:123–35; Raymond Paternoster and Alex Piquero. 1995. 
“Reconceptualizing Deterrence: An Empirical Test of Personal and Vicarious Experiences.” Journal of Research in 
Crime and Delinquency 32(3): 251–286; Raymond Paternoster and Sally Simpson. 1992. “A Rational Choice Theory of 
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this work highlights that different social locations can lead individuals to make cost 
benefit decisions differently. Simply, the assumption is that the more individuals have at 
stake to lose, the greater the likelihood they would desist and/or reject additional criminal 
activity as the absolute cost is higher. As such, this could then be carried over to assume 
that some of those actors most likely to be involved in international law violations would 
seem to be those who are most susceptible to legal sanctions given ‘what they have to 
lose’—social/political position. Individuals within positions of power in recognized 
nation-states and militaries should feel a strong deterrent effect of law. However, those 
actors with little to lose will be less deterred. 
 The assumptions of human nature that undergird the theory of deterrence are 
grounded in the belief that humans are rational actors, even if it is a bounded rationality.11 
This construction of decision making as an expressly rational cost-benefit analysis, even 
when bound by limited information and/or time and space, does not allow for 
consideration of irrational decision-making. Social theorists and philosophers have long 
contemplated the nature of man, presenting both, man as rational and man as irrational 
being. Vilfredo Pareto12 suggests that humans are not rational beings producing action. 
However, humans have a need to espouse their actions as logical and rational so they 
invent a posteriori logical reasons to justify their acts. They “wish to represent 
involuntary acts as voluntary and non-logical actions as logical ones, conjure up strangely 
imaginary reasons, which they try to use to deceive themselves as well as others about the 
true motives of their actions.” 
                                                                                                                                                 
Corporate Crime.” Pp. 194–210 in Crimes of Privilege—Readings in White-Collar Crime edited by Neal Shover and 
John Paul Wright. New York: Oxford Press; Raymond Paternoste and Sally Simpson 1996. “Sanction Threats and 
Appeal to Morality: Testing a Rational ChoiceModel of Corporate Crime.” Law and Society Review 30:549–83. 
11
 See Simon, Herbert. 1956. Models of Man. New York: Wiley and Sons.  
12
 See Vilfredo Pareto 1991: 35. The Rise and Fall of Elites, Transaction, New Brunswick, NJ,  
 6 
 While this approach to theorizing man may be the minority within the 
criminological/sociological literature, there is reason to not discount the idea in whole. 
There is ample evidence that suggests much crime commission is driven by non-rational 
elements in decision making. In the USA, homicide has the highest clearance rates of 
crimes and thus the highest certainty of punishment. Further, the law holds out severe 
sanction, including in certain jurisdictions, capital punishment. If criminal behavior were 
the end product of rational thought, criminal law should produce deterrence here above 
all other crimes. Yet, a voluminous body of research that has sought to find a deterrent 
effect of capital punishment specifically in this context has done so in vein. The absence 
of this effect is highlighted by criminological research showing that the majority of all 
homicides in the US are emotive in context, being the product of an escalation of 
aggressive interactional reactions between parties. Furthermore qualitative studies 
suggest that many other types of crimes are committed during the processes of irrational 
thought, sentiment or emotions. Wright and Decker13 establish that the in situ contexts for 
committing a burglary or armed robbery are framed within an offenders’ experiencing a 
‘pressing need for cash’ produced through participation in a street-life subculture. As 
ADAM  and New ADAM data collected in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom has shown, the majority of offenders are intoxicated at the time of their arrest 
and typically at the time of the commission of the crime.14 Such irrationality is not 
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limited to violators of ordinary crimes. Much testimony given before the Tribunal for 
Rwanda has highlighted the heavy use of alcohol and marijuana by the Interahamwe. 
Child soldiers in Sierra Leone were often drugged before combat. Dutton et al15 also 
highlight the agitated and stressed emotional state that soldiers are in during armed 
conflict situations, which can overpower reason and spill over into atrocity level violence. 
These emotive states will short circuit deterrent effects of law, thus national prosecutions 
of low-level offenders may have a retributive value but not a deterrent one as the mindset 
of the individual on-the-ground is not utilizing rational decision making mechanisms.  
 In the case of those most responsible for violations of international criminal law—
-rationality can be overshadowed by the sentiments of ideology, religion, nationalism and 
at the most basic level, power and politics. If we discount this and return to the premise 
that deterrence can work; that heads of state and other high ranking officials that 
orchestrate violations of law are rational and would not risk their social location or 
position; we may want to consider what other factors must come into play for general 
deterrence to materialize.  
 Consider that in the form of specific deterrence, control mechanisms typically, 
come into play long after the criminal actions are over and the viability and integrity of 
the state which has committed them has been compromised, thus, not swiftly. 16 
Additionally, deterrence theories locate the real general deterrent function of law and 
potential punishment not at the macro-level of society, but at the micro level of 
perception.17 Even the earliest rational choice models (e.g, Bentham and Beccaria) 
                                                 
15
 Donald G. Dutton, Ehor O. Boyanowsky, Michael Harris Bond 2005. Extreme mass homicide: From military 
massacre to genocide. Aggression and Violent Behavior 10 (2005) 437–473. 
16
 Rothe and Mullins 2006, supra note 3. 
17See Ronet Bachman, Raymond Paternoster, and Sandra Wards. 1992. “The Rationality of Sexual Offending: Testing 
a Deterrence/Rational Choice Conception of Sexual Assault.” Law and Society Review 26(2):343–72; 
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focused not simply on the intensity of certainty, celerity and proportionality of 
punishment but rather the individual’s perception of these elements.  
 However, most committers of atrocities do not perceive international law or a 
given country’s law as a threat for prosecuting their behavior, especially given the history 
of impunity and common tactics which are employed to ensure deniability (e.g., 
propaganda, political pressures, plausible deniability, and techniques of neutralization). 
We have seen this in recent cases including the United States use of torture and 
renditions, Sudan’s support of the Lord’s Resistance Army, Joseph Koney’s regrouping 
and escalation of abductions post the International Criminal Court’s warrant issued for 
his arrest. For the concept of deterrence to materialize in everyday life many factors must 
come into play at the structural and interactional levels of society (e.g., individual 
perception of the potential of being caught or held accountable) as the effect of even 
certainty is also conditioned by the individual's social environment as well as the length 
or type of punishment. Nonetheless, certainty does lend to the potential of individual 
adjusted perception of the threat of prosecution. In other words, if international law and 
its enforcement are not perceived as a real threat, general deterrence is negated.  
  Another central feature of individual perceptions which shapes the deterrent 
value of law is the individual’s perceptions of the law itself. If international criminal law 
and international criminal justice are not viewed as legitimate, the potential of general 
deterrence becomes significantly less forceful and regretfully, specific deterrence 
becomes less enforceable. The assumption then, that the rule of law and past, ongoing 
and future prosecutions of heads of state and high ranking officials have and/or will serve 
                                                                                                                                                 
CharlesTittle. 1995. Control Balance: Toward a General Theory of Deviance. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
 9 
as a general deterrent, thus reducing impunity and future law violations, is not grounded 
in sound empirical evidence or within criminological research. The notion of deterrence 
is not black and white for either general or specific deterrence, thus; the above 
assumption is not only premature but also naïve of the complexities, nuances and 
subtleties associated with effective deterrents, one of which is the perceived legitimacy of 
the law.  
Legitimacy 
 
 
Within the juristic and socio-legal literature, legitimacy is most often discussed in terms 
of or risk thereof, international institutions of control and/or their processes and 
procedures. As noted by the late German sociologist, Niklas Luhman18, “Legitimacy is 
strongly linked to impartiality, fairness and neutrality in procedure and proceedings.” 
Criminologists, on the other hand, look at issues of legitimacy in regard to policing, 
courts and the relationship of effective social order maintenance.19 What is not discussed 
in either bodies of literature however, is how issues of legitimacy are also central to 
deterrence.  
 Criminological theories, dating back to the 1930’s and Edwin Sutherland’s 
Differential Association (DA), have long noted that individuals’ definition of the law as 
favorable or unfavorable have a bearing on the decision-making processes to offend or 
not offend20. For example, DA theory highlights the impact of individuals’ definition of a 
                                                 
18
 Niklas Luhman (1978: 302). Quoted in Hans-Jorg Albrecht, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: Inequality 
and Discrimination in the German Criminal Justice System. In Legitimacy and Criminal Justice. Edited by 
Tom Tyler 2007. 
19
 Hans-Jorg Albrecht 2007. ibid 
20
 Edwin Sutherland (1939) Principles of Criminology 3rd edition. Philadelphia: Lippincoot. One cannot 
ignore the long controversy over the lack of Sutherland’s precise definition of what constitutes favorable or 
unfavorable definitions.  From an empirical quantitative testing perspective, this is highly problematic, 
however, from a qualitative testing point, this vagueness is not as problematic.  
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law as favorable or unfavorable on the decision to offend along. While unfavorable 
definitions of the law are not referred to as issues of legitimacy by Sutherland, they are 
one and the same: not viewing a particular law as legitimate is viewing it unfavorably. If 
one feels a law should not be followed, individuals will not see it as a right and proper 
restriction of behavior. Research on white collar crime has shown that the best statistical 
predictor of deterrence (not committing an action) is the individual belief that legal 
restriction in question is legitimate and morally valid.21 If a combination of law as 
unfavorable and the perception of the risks of being caught and potential punishment are 
nigh, the impact of general deterrence is negated. 
 Combining legitimacy with deterrence, the rule of law can be said to only be a 
general deterrent when the law is viewed favorably by those under its authority and when 
it is perceived at the individual level that there is a certainty of being caught and being 
held accountable. If for example, the perceived threat of being caught is strong, the 
particular law need not be viewed as legitimate. On the other hand, if law is viewed as 
legitimate, the perception of being caught holds less impact as the internalized belief in 
legitimacy can serve as a self-controlling mechanism. This has been referred to as 
legitimacy based deference.22 When both are absent, deterrence holds no effectiveness. 
Take as case in point, the following quote from Alberto Gonzales, former legal counselor 
to George W. Bush, in a memo dated January 25, 2002; “This new situation [the war on 
terrorism] renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners 
and renders quaint some of its provisions.” In this example, Gonzales states that the 
                                                 
21
 Raymond Paternoster, and Sally Simpson. 1992. “A Rational Choice Theory of Corporate Crime.” Pp. 194–210 in 
Crimes of Privilege – Readings in White-Collar Crime edited by Neal Shover and John Paul Wright. New York: 
Oxford Press. 
22
 Tyler, T. 2007. Supra note 18. 
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Geneva Conventions, pertaining to torture and the classification of prisoners as enemy 
combatants, was no longer legitimate, as such, irrelevant. This, combined with the 
perception of no threat of punishment, removed any efficacy of the deterrent effect.   
 Additionally, legitimacy and deterrence are linked via the “legitimate right to 
intervene.”23 In other words, if the authorities that are attempting to enforce the norms are 
not viewed as legitimate or having the authority, deterrence is significantly weakened and 
enforcement is more likely to have to be forcefully implemented. After all, international 
criminal justice is complementary and as such, requires voluntary cooperation from the 
population, which in this case is the international political community. As noted by Judge 
Philippe Kirsch24, past President of the International Criminal Court, “The Court’s 
mandate must be reaffirmed and respected.” Here, legitimacy is important both at the 
individual level and the collective level. This issue has been most strongly seen in the 
International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia’s initial (and continued) inability to bring 
certain suspects to trial. The widespread belief among Bosnian Serbs that the tribunal was 
a political imposition by an outside power severely hampered the tribunal’s early 
operations. Similarly, large numbers of Liberians fail to see the legitimacy of the Sierra 
Leone Tribunal’s prosecution of Charles Taylor. The position taken by the African Union 
in its July 2009 meeting that it will not cooperate with the International Criminal Court in 
the apprehension of Sudanese suspects, especially President Omar al-Bashir, further 
highlights the need of collective legitimacy in international criminal justice systems 
based on complementarities.  
                                                 
23
  See Albert Reiss 1971. The Police and the Public.New Haven, Conn. Yale University Press. 
24Judge Philippe Kirsch.  2008: 10. Address to the United Nations General Assembly. http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/60963BCD-D0D7-4DA3-B8CA-
BB80EDD49C70/279616/ICCCPISTPK20081030ENG.pdf 
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 When regimes and high-ranking officials including those of militias and 
paramilitaries positing certain international criminal laws and/or jurisdiction of 
international criminal justice as unfavorable, not legitimate, or see no perceived threat of 
prosecution, deterrence is negated and legitimacy is weakened. Behaviors are then 
justified, neutralized, or rationalized in an effort to legitimize the illegitimate. These acts 
are reclassified, reconfigured, or relabeled to coincide with a favorable definition of the 
law (i.e., techniques of neutralization) or out rightly denied based on the perception that 
there is little to no chance of being held accountable or punished for their actions (i.e., 
plausible deniability-a construct of punishment avoidance).Yet, legitimacy is central to 
the growing commitment to an international criminal justice system, global social 
stability and to the efficacy of deterrence.  
 While having presented the basic tenants of deterrence and the relevance of 
legitimacy, the following section draws together these two concepts with current judicial 
precedent decision-making. After all, as in some cases, such decisions can prove to be 
counter-productive to ensuring the efficacy of deterrence, can facilitate the promotion of 
the de-legitimization of international criminal law, can hinder the perception of potential 
prosecution, and/or can in the end lead to additional impunity.  Of course, the counter 
point to this is the need to ensure due process and indeed this is a real and grave concern. 
However, there are and have been cases where criminological research may have 
provided valuable insight that may have led to a different perception of precedence and 
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subsequent ruling.  As an example, we draw from the concept of command responsibility 
using the Judgment, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, July 2004, Case No. IT-95-14-A25. 
 
Command Responsibility 
 
 The doctrine of command responsibility has been engulfed in a quagmire since 
WWII: most notably the level of knowledge that commanders must possess regarding the 
actions of their subordinates to be held criminally liable. 26 The Additional Protocol I of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1977 codified the doctrine of command responsibility stating 
that “the fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a 
subordinate does not absolve his superiors from …responsibility…if they knew, or had 
information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the 
time, that he was committing or about to commit such a breach and if they did not take all 
feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach” (Article 86:2). 
Responsibility of commanders and superiors, Article 28 (a) of the Rome Statute, sets two 
different standards: 
“ (a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be 
criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces 
under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the 
case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, 
where: 
                                                 
25
 This section draws from Rothe, Dawn L 2009“Judgement, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, July 2004, 
Case No. IT-95-14-A. Commentary”. Cases of International Criminal Tribunals: The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Vol XX. Editors: André Klip and Göran Sluiter. Forthcoming. 
26
 Eugenia Levine 2005. ‘Command Responsibility: The Mens Rea Requirement’, Global Policy Forum 5 
available online at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/general/2005/command.htm (visited 3 June 
2008) 
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(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the 
time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such 
crimes.” 
On the other hand, Article 28 (b) sets a more lenient standard for superiors. 
“(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph (a), 
a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a result of 
his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates, where:  
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly 
indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes; 
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and 
control of the superior; and 
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her 
power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent 
authorities for investigation and prosecution.” 
 The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia Statute, Article 7 (3), 
notes that if crimes were committed by a subordinate, the superior is not relieved of 
criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that said subordinate was about 
to or had committed such acts and the superior failed to take reasonable measures to 
prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators. The meaning of “had reason to know” 
received conflicting interpretations in the cases of The Prosecutor v. Delalic et al (the 
Celebici case)27 and The Prosecutor v. Blaskic.  
                                                 
27
 See The Prosecutor v. Delalic et al (the Celebici case) IT-96-21-T, 16 November, 1998.  
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 In the case of the Prosecutor v. Blaskic, the Trial Chamber’s interpretation of ‘had 
reason to know’ was more closely aligned with the Yamashita Tribunal Decision28. The 
Blaskic Trial Chamber found that ‘had reason to know’ in Article 7(3) of the ICTY 
Statute imposed a stricter meaning for the ‘should have known’ standard of mens rea. 
On the other hand, the Appeals Chamber used the more lenient application of command 
responsibility in that it should be applied only when a person orders an act or omission 
with the awareness that there is a substantial likelihood that a crime would be committed 
in the execution of that order—thus finding Blaškić not responsible for ordering the 
crimes in Ahmici29, the Vitez Municipality, and other targeted regions. 
The Chamber states, 
“The Appeals Chamber considers that the Celebici Appeal Judgment has settled  the 
issue of interpretation of the standard of “had reason to know.” In that judgment, the 
Appeals Chamber stated that “a superior will be criminally responsible through the 
principles of superior responsibility only if information was available to him which 
would have put him on notice of offences committed by subordinates”….There is no 
reason for the Appeals Chamber to depart from that position. The Trial Judgment’s 
                                                 
28
 Decision of the United States Military Commission at Manila, 7 December, 1945, reprinted in Leon 
Friedman 1972. (ed.) 2 The Law of War: A Documentary History pp. 1596. 
Yamashita was charged with ‘unlawfully disregarding and failing to discharge his duty as a commander to 
control the acts of members of his command by permitting them to commit war crimes.’ In finding 
Yamashita guilty, the Commission stated that when ‘vengeful actions are widespread offences and there is 
no effective attempt by a commander to discover and control the criminal acts, such a commander may be 
held responsible, even criminally liable.’ 
29
 Appeals Chamber Decision, para. 348 Therefore, the Appeals Chamber is not satisfied that the relevant 
trial evidence and the additional evidence admitted on appeal prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Appellant is responsible under Article 7 (1) of the Statute for ordering the crimes committed in the Ahmic’i 
area on 16 April 1993. 
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interpretation of the standard is not consistent with the jurisprudence of the Appeals 
Chamber in this regard and must be corrected accordingly.” 30 
This is re-established later in the judgment with, 
“The Appeals Chamber has stated earlier in this judgment, that the Trial Chamber erred 
in its interpretation of the mental element “had reason to know”…. Therefore the Appeals 
Chamber will apply the correct legal standard to determine whether the Appellant had 
reason to know the crimes had been committed in the Ahmici area on 16 April 
1993….the Appeals Chamber considers that the mental element “had reason to know” as 
articulated in the Statute, does not automatically imply a duty to obtain information.”31 
 Yet, this decision calls into question the stated desire of the tribunal to end the 
impunity of heads of state and commanders and to serve as a general deterrent given the 
catalysts typically employed by these actors to ensure plausible deniability. Simply, there 
is dissonance between the legal interpretation and application herein and the on-the-
ground reality of crime commission. There is a profusion of criminological research that 
supports a stricter interpretation of command responsibility and mens rea given general 
enactment patterns.32 For example, scholars of organizational crime have pointed out that 
numerous organizational goals and drives generate criminogenic impulses. Further, as 
commander of an organization, one is able to bend the capacity of the organization itself 
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to the fulfillment of individual goals of the ones that possess control. Years of state crime 
and violations of international criminal law research have shown that in many cases 
military leaders make token efforts to show a level of control of their troops, but fail to 
systematically enforce these rules as their overall goals are better fulfilled by allowing the 
commission of crimes, not enforcing the expected norms or rules.33  
 In addition to the raw empowerment of controlling a government, paramilitary, or 
commander of a militia, they typically hold control of the instruments of secrecy and 
privacy. Simply, due to a bureaucracy’s ability to control information flow within itself 
as well as what information gets released to the outside, it can hide the true nature and 
extent of certain actions from members in other subunits as well as the world at large.34  
 Within these military (and quasi military) organizations the innate division of 
labor, and role specialization, enhances opportunity to utilize plausible deniability: one 
can use these basic dynamics to avoid both legal and perceived moral culpability. In a 
large amalgam of people, it is difficult to identify specific perpetrators within actions and 
direct evidence of a commander’s knowledge of their subordinates’ actions. It is this that 
many perpetrators count on.  
 Criminological research has also shown that many commanders of military and 
paramilitary groups often count on the doctrine of plausible deniability by claiming the 
bad apple or rogue actor scenario, broken or multiple command structures, and/or 
ineffective lines of communication to ensure impunity. This, plausible deniability, is a 
political practice, not to be confused with the legal concept of willful blindness. Plausible 
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deniability occurs when said actor has the knowledge and at times actively participates in 
crime commission, directly and/or indirectly through orders, though it is guised in an 
effort to cover-up any factual evidence linking them to the crime. The process can, 1) 
involve the creation of power structures and chains of command loose and informal 
enough to be denied if necessary; 2) claiming the rogue actor scenario and/or; 3) create 
and/or destroy factual proof of command and/or directives to evade fulfillment of the 
requirements of burden of proof. As previously noted, the opportunity to either create a 
loose chain of command is relatively easy given the access to resources or the structure 
can be in its ideal format, yet resources are available to mask the tightness of the 
organization. An active policy of ensuring plausible deniability protects both the inner 
political elite circle and military leaders by limiting prosecutions to the lowest levels of 
involvement. This is the direct opposite of the stated goals of international criminal law 
and international criminal justice.  
 There is reason to believe that Blaškic successfully engaged in the use of this 
political practice. Consider the additional evidence, Exhibits 1, 13, 14, that was allowed 
during his Appeal that suggested the attack on Ahmici and the surrounding villages were 
‘revenge attacks’ by rogue individuals. Recall the rogue actor scenario is a common tool 
used to divert attention from the chain of command. During the trial, however, Blaškic’s 
testimony excluded this scenario. His testimony heard by the Trial Chamber claimed the 
attack was organized and planned at the level of command within a military hierarchical 
structure, contradicting the admitted evidence used by the Appeals Chamber. Consider 
Blaškic’s own words, 
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“Q. At the time on TV cameras and addressing the entire population of the Lasva Valley, 
you said that the crime had been committed in an organised manner, systematically, on 
the basis of a plan, and under somebody's control or command. Could you explain those 
four points of your allegations? Why did you say that, first, that it was an organised 
systematic, planned and controlled operation? 
A. First of all, it could not have been done by a group of three or four drunken persons, 
drunken soldiers, and that they had done it of their own accord. When I said that it was 
organised, I felt that there must have been some preparation behind it, preparation for 
such destruction…and when I say that it was under somebody's control, it means that I 
was sure that the group that committed it was under the control of an elected commander 
of its own.”35 
 In light of the transcript from the trial, the additional evidence provided by the 
Appellant suggests the most common tactic of plausible deniability was used - chain of 
command loose and informal enough to be denied if necessary and the use of the few 
rogue soldiers scenario. While there are other issues with the additional evidence that was 
used in making their decision,36 this evidence was used in making their judgment of 
command responsibility.  
 When the goal of international trials, as stated by the Appeals Chamber, is both, 
accountability and general deterrence, a lenient interpretation fuels the already well-
known and enacted praxis of plausible deniability by claiming failed communication 
structures, weakened chain of command, and/or separation of consequences, further 
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ensuring impunity and weakening the potential of law and future prosecutions’ general 
deterrent effect.  
Conclusion 
 
Beyond examinations of deterrence and legitimacy, criminologists have much to 
contribute to international criminal justice. As noted, there are social, political, cultural, 
and geographical issues that play a role in not only crime commission, but in the 
hindrance of and/or facilitation of deterrence. Criminologists are well positioned to show 
how these connections may facilitate or hinder the broader goals of the legal community.   
 As previously noted, even though those with the most at risk, significance of 
social location, are assumed to be the easiest to deter, other factors must come into play 
before international criminal law and international criminal justice can serve as 
deterrents. It must be perceived at the individual level that there is a certainty of risk of 
being caught, being held accountable. The enforcement mechanisms and law must be 
viewed favorable or have legitimacy not just at the collective level but by individuals in 
the position to violate these laws.  
 As such, the current rather blind belief in the deterrent impact of international 
criminal justice remains, regretfully, a bit premature. Additionally, as has been noted, as 
long as tried and true catalysts such as plausible deniability, use of a scapegoat, 
sacrificing underlings, or claiming the bad apple or rogue agent, can be successfully 
engaged and then not recognized and/or ignored in the judicial decision-making 
processes, a global deterrent effect will regretfully remain in the distant future. Simply, 
criminology has relevance to the understanding not only of crime commission and 
subsequent control, but also what impact the criminal justice system, laws, and 
 21 
subsequent legal decisions have on the broader goals of ending impunity, enhancing 
international criminal justice legitimacy, and the maintenance of the broader global social 
order.  
 
 
